Personal Information is accessed so easily through the Internet that it causes concern for its privacy, handling of personally identifiable information (PII), and its correctness. With the use of a credit card and picking anyone’s name and selecting a state of some form of known or suggested relevance to an individual, anyone can acquire information on one’s profile. Whether the information on that purchased profile is correct, leads many to discuss liability. It also gives room for some to argue that online accessed misinformation is harmful to anyone’s reputation which could affect employment and other aspects of our daily social and economic life.
On another point, the handling of PII is more complicated than one can fathom. The elements of PII are in and of themselves very telling. Is the asking for certain elements of your PII infringing privacy? Is the sharing of elements of PII for third-party marketers infringing? Most people wonder why does anyone want that detail of information in the first place. Focused marketing driven by data identifying points of anyone’s PII is profitable and is as well valuable to be sold by data aggregators. An extension of this is the issue of privacy and when and how one’s privacy becomes a point worthy of discussion. Such ongoing discussions reach how in public proceedings the PII of individuals must be dealt with care. The harm that can be realized from any mishandling of one’s PII is considered uncertain and could be undetermined. Yet, what can be determined is the potential for the loss of privacy and the risk of misuse of one’s identity.
Whether a harm is actual and palpable was an issue discussed in the Supreme Court case involving a suit filed against a data aggregator. Spokeo aggregates data from online sources and public records at the state level. It markets its service and product as providing a search engine for finding information about people. It sold personal profiles. However, when a profile is inaccurate, such as the profile of the plaintiff in Robins v Spokeo, aka Spokeo v. Robins on appeal, it could be a violation of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA). The FCRA was promulgated to address the false information in credit files that was used to deny mortgages and insurance. The nature of the information that was culled by Spokeo, became a central consideration to determine if there is the liability.
Aside from the liability for the correctness, there was the argument of standing to sue. While the district court initially denied Spokeo’s motion to dismiss the complaint about the lack of jurisdiction followed by a subsequent reconsideration and dismissal with prejudice, the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court was incorrect in the assessment of the ‘injury in fact’ element of the case. The Ninth stated that the violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing.’ The Court determined that the tangibility of an injury does not necessarily require it to be concrete. Congress, the Court states, “has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.” The occurrence of a violation of a statutory right is insufficient to merit the qualification of Article III standing. Yet, the Court elaborated that, “this does not mean that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness.” Since the plaintiff’s profile represented incorrect data about him, the discussion circled around on whether this was a harm that would satisfy the standing requirement.
The Supreme Court stated that the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure. It also explained that “just as the common law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” The Court ultimately reasoned that beyond its analysis of the distinction of the concreteness and particularization of an event to constitute qualifying injury in fact for Article III standing, it was not going to rule on the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the needed analysis. It did not because it believed that the Ninth Circuit failed to fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness and particularization. The Court deemed the Ninth Circuit’s analysis as not fulfilled, hence it remanded to the Ninth to consider its analysis.
Personal information about individuals in profiles sold by aggregators will continue to prod more discussion about the handling of PII, the privacy of PII, and the standing of claimants when disclosures or incorrect data is revealed. What remains are a series of questions that touch upon whether the risk of misuse of PII is considered weighty aside from the occurring statutory violation? Or, whether the risk of economic loss from a mischaracterization of someone in a sold profile be considered a valid basis for standing? What remains open is the determination of the appropriate basis for, “What’s the harm”, when the online personal information is incorrect.
 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of” consumer reports, 15 U. S. C. §1681e(b), and imposes liability on “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the Act] with respect to any” individual, §1681n(a). Claimants under the FCRA could seek $100 to $1,000 in damages.
 Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460 (2009) (free speech); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993) (free exercise).
 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 559–560 (1992), at 580.
“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to create Article III standing”)
 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. ____.
 See, e.g., Restatement (First) of Torts §§569 (libel), 570 (slander per se) (1938).
 See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 20–25 (1998) (confirming that a group of voters’ “inability to obtain information” that Congress had decided to make public is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 449 (1989) (holding that two advocacy organizations’ failure to obtain information subject to disclosure under the Federal Advisory Committee Act “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”).